welcome to EconomistRussia.com - related EconomistAmerica.com Russia is member of trading friendship networks: SCO cofounded since 1996-includes china pakistan india since 2017 various countries west of china south of russia which otherwise be very landlocked in middle of eurasia; BRICS (5 fastest changing nations -includes new dev bank), Arctic circle 8 nations include nordica, canada,usa- analysing 1984-1989 which politicians blinked over greatest peace opp since ww2.World Trade History of Calls to make friends with Russian peoples - see also AAAnation.ning.com

1984 #theeconomist foreseeing fall of berlin wall- urgent opportunity for peace dividend replacing cold war, welcome world trade with russian small enterprises
1996 lapere summit hosted in china -lets rebuild eurasian trade the way it positively civilised the world during days of silk road (see reports of marco polo)

china was invited to trade with fastest growing economies at BRICSforum from ...
following on clear assessment of chinese peoples needs and the nations rejuvenation, xi jinping announced his signature trade process with national and other place leaders will invite everyone to map one belt road
A=arctic B=brics
Finland AC
Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania Belarus; Ukraine
Georgia; Azerbaijan Turkmenistan;Uzbekistan;Kazakhstan
N Korea
Near Neigbors
Turkey Syria,Iraq Iran ,Afghanistan
Armenia, Poland,Germany
US Alaska AC Sweden AC Canada AC Iceland AC Greenland (Denmark) ac
S Korea; Japan;Taiwan..

Thursday, February 4, 2021


Finland’s Strategic Energy Plan Threatens to Render Russian Power Imports Obsolete

The past week saw significant speculation in the Russian media about a recently published long-term power development strategy issued by Fingrid (Finland’s primary state-run power operator), which laid out a plan for the country to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035 through investment in the country’s renewable energy sector.  Several Russian publications have interpreted Fingrid’s proposed strategy as meaning the country would end its electricity purchases from Russia’s Inter RAO as early as 2030.

In a failed attempt to allay these concerns, the planning director of the company, Jussi Jyrinsalo, noted on February 2 that “We [Fingrid] do not express the position whether we need electricity from Russia or no.”  As recently as 2018, Russia accounted for approximately 7% of Finland’s total electricity consumption and 28% of its net electricity imports.  Still, Finland has maintained alternatives to Russia, relying on domestic production and imports from other EU power markets through the Nordic electricity market (NordPool).

While Finland’s level of dependence on Russian power imports is less significant in this context, InterRAO, on the other hand, has seen Finland develop into a rather crucial market.  As of 2019, the country accounted for 36% of the Russian company’s electricity exports (approximately 22 billion rubles per year in revenue), meaning Finland’s diminishing electricity imports could negatively impact Inter RAO’s revenue stream.

In the recent past, Finnish energy policy has been the target of foreign espionage efforts according to the country’s intelligence agency, Supo.  In 2015, Supo disclosed, without naming a country, that “foreign intelligence” sought to “aggressively” influence the country’s energy policy decisions, as well as gather information on attitudes of Finnish politicians and citizens toward EU policy and NATO cooperation.

In the strategy document, Fingrid also acknowledges that, alongside achieving carbon neutrality by 2035, investing in domestic renewable power has the potential to create an energy surplus in the domestic market.  Although an exact timeline for this outcome remains vague, an energy surplus could foreseeably make Finland a net exporter of electricity and allow it to supply other regional power sector markets seeking to mitigate Russian power dependencies.  The Baltic states continue their ongoing efforts to decouple from the Russian power grid and synchronize with the EU power sector.  The three countries and Finland are all part of NordPool.

Russian publications such as Kommersant have attempted to downplay the impact of the new strategy on Inter RAO, noting that the document acknowledges the continued role of Russian-Finnish transmission lines, such as the Vyborg-Yllikkala line, and integrates Rosatom’s ongoing construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP) in Finland’s Hanhikivi peninsula as part of the operator’s push for domestic renewable energy.  Even the NPP, however, is called into question by the strategic document, which paints a scenario where the plant is either delayed or cancelled.

No comments:

Post a Comment